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JUSTICE DOUGLAS ON FREEDOM IN THE
WELFARE STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
HANS LINDE*

I. THE TURN TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Twenty-five years, in constitutional law, is a long enough span that
at its end a generation is apt to confront the problems created by its
solutions to the tasks it inherited at the beginning. In the years before
Mr. Justice Douglas took his seat on the Supreme Court in 1939, the
attention of the whole nation had been held by an epic of constitutional
history-the decision whether American government had the constitutional power to cope with the economic and social crisis of a breakdown
in the private economy. In 1937, the Supreme Court had unlocked
the federal arsenal. The previous year, in the very course of striking
down the first AAA, the Court had given its blessing to a broad, Hamiltonian reading of the spending power,' and it had repulsed an attack
on the TVA.' It looked as if with the opening page of the 301st volume
of its Reports, the Court was turning over a new leaf: the commerce
clause was held to support regulation of labor relations in industrial
production; 3 and an ingenious use of taxes, credits, and payments
permitted the nation to place its financial credit rather than that of
near-bankrupt and mutually competitive states behind unemployment
and retirement benefits through the Social Security Act.4 The Federal
government was not again to be held to lack the tools for an economic
task.
If the vindication of federal powers had been the most dramatic,
it had not been the only reevaluation by the Court of the role of
government in an economy capable of the Great Depression. Contrary
to the dichotomy invoked in the conventional legal arguments, the
Justices who had resisted using and ultimately had withdrawn the
judicial veto of federal action were also sympathetic toward the states.
The due process clause was the chief but not the only battleground.
When Thomas Reed Powell spoke to the Washington State Bar in
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon Law School.

' United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
2 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
3N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) ; Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937). This approach is said to have been suggested by Mr. Justice
Brandeis;

see SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL

302 (1958).
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1938 about current constitutional law, his timely illustrations included
Mr. Justice Roberts' swing of the Court from finding a denial of due
process in New York's minimum wage law in 1936 to sustaining that
of Washington in 1937; two very recent decisions had told the federal
courts in diversity cases to follow the opinions of state courts on state
law, and denied immunity from federal admissions tax to state college
football tickets.' State regulatory power had newly survived challenges
based on claims of exclusive federal authority and legislation,' and
states were holding their own in the struggle for constitutionally taxable objects.' In the course of 1937 the Supreme Court had assured
Washington that it could inspect the hulls of federally-licensed motor
tugs even though they might operate on navigable waters in interstate
commerce; it could make an interstate railroad pay a fee to cover the
costs of state inspection, but it could tax a stevedoring company only
on the business of furnishing longshoremen, not on loading or unloading
ships in interstate or foreign commerce; it could tax the gross income
of federal contractors building Grand Coulee Dam and their use of
machinery brought from other states to build it.'
The new recognition of the country's power to govern itself was
accompanied by a quickened concern for individual rights. In 1938,
the Court had taken the decisive first step toward securing educational
equality for Negroes.' As the states were freed to regulate prices,
5 Powell, A Constitution For an Indefinite and Expanding Future, 14 WASHr. L.
citing Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) ; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) ; Allen v. University System, 304 U.S. 439 (1938). Professor Powell's comments (14 WAsH. L. RF.V. at 107) were perhaps less than fair to the role in the two
REv. 99 (1939),

due process cases of Mr. Justice Roberts, who had written the Court's first statement
of the contemporary position in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See
Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. Rr-v. 311, 313-17 (1955).
6 South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938);
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).

7 See, e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938);
Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937); James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303
U.S.
604 (1938); but also Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
8

Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) ; Great No. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 300

U.S. 154 (1937); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302 U.S.
90 (1937) ; Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 186 (1937) ; Henneford v.

Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). Commissioner Henneford's string ran out in
the October, 1938, term; Washington could not tax the gross receipts from the
business of marketing Washington fruit throughout the United States and abroad.
Gwin, White & Prince, Inc., v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
9 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). One would like to say

that the Court was never again to sustain any form of racial discrimination, were it
not for the endorsement given the war-time treatment of Americans of Japanese
ancestry, Hirabayashi v United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); contrast the judicial courage even in the face of

claimed military necessity in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39

wages and hours of work, they were also warned that the fourteenth
amendment imposed tighter standards, in the name of freedom of
speech, assembly, religion, and fair procedures, on their ways of dealing with agitators, troublemakers, and Jehovah's Witnesses °0- such
personal rights essential to the political process, or inherently helpless
against it, might be "subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny.""
The rights of defendants in federal prosecutions were to be jealously
guarded, 2 though state criminal procedures need only stay within
limits of fundamental principles of justice "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."'" Washington found one of its criminal sentences reversed under the ex post facto clause. 4 In time, these issues of personal
liberty were to become the new storm centers; some dividing the Justices, others the country, they would make the Court's work as controversial as had the issues of 1935-38. But to the view of 1939, it was
the constitutional ability of government to gain control of the economy
that held the center of the stage.
Yet even as regulation, by statutory or delegated rule-making, was
winning its final constitutional battles, other forms of governmental
action were gaining new significance. By the time the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 were
sustained in terms giving federal commerce power its most sweeping
modern definition, and an opinion by the new Mr. Justice Douglas
was clearing away one more barrier to state social legislation," the
nation was becoming deeply involved in the early stages of World War
II; the war power would soon impose all-pervading economic controls.'
By 1944 the Federal budget absorbed half of the national economy;
as many as 18 million men and women were drawn into direct military
and civilian government service, and other millions of private employees were wholly engaged in war production. At war's end the
tool chosen to meet the anticipated problems of reconversion (as, for
instance, in the full employment bill and the G.I. Bill of Rights) was
lo De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
"AUnited States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n. 4 (1938).
12 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S.

379 (1937).

1' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
'" Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
is United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918) ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; Olsen v. Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 (1941), overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
"I See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (price control) ; Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (rent control).
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the public purse, not the sovereign command. Congressmen and state
legislators have continued to find this an easier, more nearly painless
tool. More and more, the political urge to meet perceived social needs
has taken the form of programs to render direct aid or services rather
than to impose regulations on resisting institutions of the private economy. There has been some legislative tinkering at the periphery of
regulatory schemes established years ago; labor relations alone has
remained a field of such recurring battles between giant adversaries
of the private sector as the Taft-Hartley Law of 1947, the state Rightto-Work campaigns in the 1950's, the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.
The priorities of the international fever chart have diverted the nation's political energy to new ventures in foreign aid, rearmament,
Korea, the great Communist hunt, most recently the space race, which
in different ways have further extended government involvement in
the economy. But in domestic affairs as such, apart from the biennial,
pre-election improvements in social security benefits or an occasional
increase in the minimum wage, the dominant concerns of all levels of
government have become programs of public services or financial incentives for private action. Even a partial, random list suggests the
range from the most traditional to the newest, from direct national
management through the proliferating grants-in-aid to mere support
of the credit of state, local, or private agencies: Construction of dams
and airports, highways, harbors, hospitals, and housing; education
from kindergarten to post-doctoral fellowships; welfare, mental health,
juvenile delinquency; rivers, forests, parks, and outdoor recreation;
air pollution and water pollution; agricultural marketing and soil
management; research in how to grow more and rewards for growing
less; research toward curing more people and toward killing more
people; plans to rehabilitate uneconomic industries and their workers
and plans for attracting industry elsewhere. It is one measure of the
public sector that in 1962, when the gross national product was $555
billion, a total of $175.8 billion was spent by government at all levels."
This pervasive expansion of the public sector reflects no radical
break with tradition, no coherent new theory of government, but
pragmatic political responses to a series of separate and diverse demands for action. Yet as each program pursues its own task, taken
together they have inescapably affected also the tasks confronting
constitutional law. Problems of once rare or marginal governmental
17 Fed. Reserve Bull., December 1963, p. 1718; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances in 1962 (Oct. 1963), p. 3.
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activities recur more insistently, and the syllogisms that disposed of
them when such activities were peripheral to the main concerns of
government break down under the burden of modern realities. When
eight million Americans work for public agencies, their constitutional
status can no longer be adequately premised on debating whether or
not it is a privilege. The legal characteristics of programs that sustain
life for 27 millions of old, ill, handicapped, or deserted men, women,
and children are not exhaustively defined by the concept of gratuity.
The United States Forest Service or the public educational systems
of Washington fit awkwardly into the law of vendor and purchaser,
landlord and tenant, guardian and ward. When government serves,
owns, manages, sells, it yet remains government, the object of constitutional law.
The problems which the growth of the public sector has newly posed
for constitutional law involve issues, not of constitutional power, but
of constitutional limitations. By 1942 the Supreme Court had reaffirmed the constitutional power to govern in terms so comprehensive
that the authority of the federal and state governments to engage in
economic and social programs is rarely doubted. But what of the
restraints with which the Constitution18 circumscribes the exercise of
public authority? Do they or do they not apply to direct governmental
activities as they do to traditional governmental regulation? Are there
constitutional rights in the public sector-or is the Prince's pen, in a
checkbook, mightier than his sword?
This is the question which the welfare state with increasing insistence brings to the Court. The question is not merely rhetorical, nor,
posed thus broadly, will it permit a single, simple answer. We need
only plot the two dimensions of the problem to indicate its magnitude
and complexity. Along one, the state appears in its functional roles:
As owner and manager of land and natural resources, buildings and
roads, dams and irrigation pipes, transportation and other utility
systems; as buyer and seller of property; as employer; as banker
and underwriter of credit; as contractor for goods and services; as
distributor of food, housing, water, electricity, education, medical care,
and cash. Along the other appear the constitutional limitations on
government's use of its power: Due process and equal protection under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the freedoms guaranteed by the
first amendment, the privileges and immunities of article IV, the comis This article considers only federal limitations, not state constitutional restrictions
on state or local action.
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merce clause, the express prohibitions of article I, sections 9 and 10,
the concept of intergovernmental immunity. Neither list is exhaustive,
but the theoretical possibilities are obvious. In fact some of the resulting constitutional questions reached the courts long ago; some have
recently come under frequent and extensive consideration; some remain theoretical. We may expect concrete cases presented for decision
to increase as their claims on the public sector become important to
more and more people. Thus it is worthwhile to trace the development
of doctrine with which the courts may meet such claims.
II. TH

RoLE oF TE JuDGE

There is special interest in tracing this development in the work of
Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas. Legal doctrine for immediate use
must be sought in the holdings and opinions of past and present
majorities, in the authoritative end products of collective decision.
But the processes of thought and commitment remain personal. The
apologia for the power of appellate courts in the common law tradition
has been that the rule of law rests in the constraints which loyalty to
the continuum of collective judgment imposes on individual judicial
impulses. On the Supreme Court of the United States those Justices
have been remembered in whose work commitment to a coherent personal view has taken precedence over the continuity of the collective
doctrine. "A judge who is asked to construe or interpret the Constitution often rejects the gloss which his predecessors have put on it,"
Mr. Justice Douglas in 1948 told an ABA audience in Seattle. "For it
is the Constitution which we have sworn to defend, not some predecessor's interpretation of it." 9 In his study of the role of stare decisis, he
spoke of the antinomies of constitutional judgment:
The problem of the judge is to keep personal predilection from dictating the choice and to be as faithful as possible to the architectural
scheme. We can get from those who preceded a sense of the continuity
of a society. We can draw from their learning a feel for the durability
of a doctrine and a sense of the origins of principles. But we have
experience that they never knew. Our vision may be shorter or longer.

But it is ours. It is better that we make our own history than be
governed by the dead.20
19 Douglas, The Dissenting Opinion, address to the Section on Judicial Adminis-

tration, American Bar Association, Seattle, Washington, Sept. 9, 1948, 8 LAWYER'S
GUILD REV., 6 (1948), reprinted in WESTIN, THE SUPREME COURT: VIEWs FROM
INsmE
51 at 54 (1961).
2
o Douglas, Stare Dedsis, lecture to the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, April 22, 1949, 49 COLUm. LAw REV. 735, 739 (1949), reprinted in WESTIN,

op. cit. supra n. 19 at 122, 126.
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In a quarter of a century on the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas
has seen the development of the burgeoning public sector and has met
its constitutional problems one by one in cases coming to the Court.
The manner in which one justice has worked out his stand on these
problems, in majority opinion, concurrence, or dissent, not only contributes to our history; it may also offer, better than the mere collection of precedents, one coherent vision to the "oncoming group from
a new generation" who must judge "the work of our present and
their past."2 1
Moreover, Mr. Justice Douglas' response to this development of our
time is to be found largely in the evidence of his work on the Supreme
Court. At the age of 39, he did not bring to the Court a long-held and
fully articulated philosophy of the role and limits of direct public
activities in the economy. To the contrary, as teacher, author, and
later on the S.E.C., the young Professor Douglas had been concerned
with the law and institutions of the private sector, with bankruptcy
and corporations and finance, with the movement toward new realism
and reforms that could preserve private decision-making in the American economy under the 20th-century stresses dramatized by the long
crisis beginning in 1929. To these concerns, constitutional issues would
at first have relevance only as a peripheral barrier to action. Reform
did not mean to replace private by public institutions, it meant to make
private institutions work, and work with responsible regard for public
interests. Its tools were to be found in the law, in legislation, in the
regulatory powers of government. But if reform implied an idealistic
view of ends to be served by pragmatic experimentation with methods,
it also meant equal respect for the choice of the politically responsible
agencies whether they pursued the public welfare by regulation or by
direct public services, spending, or management. The community
could try various roads to reach its social goals. In time, however,
this pursuit would come to confront other values with which the
Constitution does not invite experimentation.
After ten years on the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas in one
essay brought together his beliefs in the principles with which
democracy should meet the challenge of totalitarianism of left or right:
Commitment to the goal of human welfare, to the democratic and
pragmatic choice of means, and to the primacy of the values of freedom. "The human welfare state is the great political invention of the
21 Id. at 737, WESTIN at 124.
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twentieth century," he said in 1949. But man "can achieve happiness
only when he is free ....
"
If we exploit our political freedom to the fullest, we can show the world
the way to preserve incentive and independence for the individual and
security for the masses of the people....
The challenge to us is to avoid becoming prisoners of any dogma
whether it be free enterprise or government ownership or control. We
must preserve flexibility in our thinking, so that we may pick and
choose the best device for each task at hand. We must carry that
attitude into our social and economic affairs. We must nourish the
experimental approach....
We place our faith in a society that preserves the greatest possible
22
freedom for the individual yet secures the masses in their basic needs.
III. PpIVATE PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Democratic choice of ends and means, wide scope for pragmatic
experiment, preservation of freedom-these criteria imply an approach
to judicial review: slow to confine government to the conventional
pursuit of traditional goals, quick to protect individual rights and the
conditions of the democratic process itself. Two cases illustrate the
application of such an approach to the simplest and oldest collision of
the public sector with private rights, the taking of property for public
use. Government may take with at least the same latitude with which
it may regulate. But it must pay for what it takes.
Berman v. Parker" sustained urban redevelopment in the District
of Columbia by the public purchase of land for resale or lease for
private development in accordance with a comprehensive land-use
plan. Resisting landowners protested that the taking of property which
was not itself substandard or otherwise objectionable, and which
would eventually be returned to private management, was not taking
"for a public use" but rather "without due process of law" under the
fifth amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the unanimous
Court is likely to remain the classic statement of the community's
right to control its physical environment for human needs. The Constitution does not restrict the legislative vision of community welfare
to the eradication of tangible evils known to eighteenth century
village councils.
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and orderthese are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional
22 Douglas, The Human Welfare State, Remsen Bird Lecture at Occidental College,
Los Angeles, California, 1949, 97 U. P. L. RFv. 597, 600-607 (1949).
23 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely
illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it .... Miserable
and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease
and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by
reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may
indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be
an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which
makes it a place from which men turn. The misery of housing may
despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river.24
They are the words of a Justice who writes of the men and the mountains of Washington and Oregon in his office overlooking the slums
below Capitol Hill that are destined for redevelopment.
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. ...

The values

it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
25
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
"Police power," if the inherited term must be used, is a description,
not a grant of legislative power. It cannot be used by judges as a
source of limitation. And the standard of the public interest is as
broad when the method chosen is to take property as for other
legislation.
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation ....
This principle admits of no exception merely because the power of
eminent domain is involved. The role of the judiciary in determining
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an
extremely narrow one. See Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States,
269 U.S. 55, 66; United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552....
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize
it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of
eminent domain is merely the means to the end .... Here one of the
means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the
area.... The public end may be as well or better served through an
agency of private enterprise than through a department of government
-or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public
24

25

Id. at 32-3.
Ibid.
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ownership is the sole method of2 promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.
Government is not to be driven by a restrictive doctrine of public use
into a choice between inaction and state socialism," imprisoned in the
dogma of either free enterprise or government ownership. The public
sector offers a more flexible choice of devices. "The rights of these
property owners are satisfied when they receive the just compensation28
which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking,;
concluded the Court.
The fifth amendment is as capable of expansion to protect those
rights as it is to accommodate modern community needs. If Berman
v. Parkerheld that traditional property concepts will not let the landowner block progress, Causby" had shown that they also would not
let the community evade sharing the cost of progress with the landowner in its path. Progress here took the path of glide of military
aircraft over a chicken farm adjacent to an airport. Glare and noise
caused panic and death among the chickens and made the land untenable as a farm residence. The Court held that a taking of property
had occurred for which the owner must be compensated. Property
need not be held to extend ad coelum to be constitutionally protected
against impairment of its use from above. "Common sense revolts at
the idea," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas. "To recognize such private
claims to the airspace would.., transfer into private ownership that
to which only the public has a just claim."'
Yet the landowner's
domain extends some distance above the earth's surface. Realism,
not abstract principles, must draw the line between the private and
the public sector, between "incidental damage" and "taking." "The
fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant
as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer
of real estate."'" The airspace is part of the public domain, and the
airplane, with its incidental inconveniences, part of the modern environment of life; but when low and frequent flights impair the
usefulness and value of specific property, the Court would find a
servitude imposed on the land for which the Constitution grants compensation."
2c6
Ibid.
2

7

See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Su-

prente Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 Supreme Court Review 63, 66.
28 348 U.S. at 36.

29 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
80 Id.at 261.
3. Id.at 262.

32

Id.at 266-67.
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The government had taken Causby's property by the flight of its
planes; the government choosing to build the airport was equally
responsible. By the time Mr. Justice Douglas again wrote for the
3 Congress had added
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Allegheny County,"
to the airspace in the public domain that airspace needed for take-off
or landing. The county, owner of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport,
argued that the airlines or the Federal government did the taking. But
the Court held that it was the local authority that determined whether,
where, and how to build its airport; it could not escape liability for
taking the adjacent landowner's property and incurring the obligation
to pay for it under the fourteenth amendment. Would the federal
government, which had claimed the airspace, which set the design
standards for the airport and paid half or more of its cost, and which
controlled the flight of airplanes to and from it, also be responsible?
"The Federal Government takes nothing," 4 wrote Mr. Justice Douglas,
but the context shows, nothing until a local agency decides to build an
airport. The issue of federal liability was not before the court.35 In a
federal system, the public sector has its special internal complexities;
but the burden of their proper adjustment is not to be shifted to the
private claimant.
Government must pay for what it takes. But it is not to be charged
for what it already owns. The Western heritage that Mr. Justice
Douglas brought to the Supreme Court finds its greatest expression in
his concern for the public domain, and particularly for its water
resources. The development of these resources during the past thirty
years has been reflected in a series of decisions involving constitutional
issues of federal power, intergovernmental relations, and compensation
for private rights. Opportunities came early for Mr. Justice Douglas
to develop a judicial philosophy toward these issues.
In 1941, he wrote for the unanimous Court in sustaining the constitutionality of federal construction of the Denison Dam and
Reservoir on the Red River in Oklahoma, over the objections of the
State of Oklahoma. 6 Though the stream being dammed was not
navigable, flood control on the nonnavigable tributaries of navigable
tributaries of navigable streams was held within the necessary and
proper execution of the commerce power. The Constitution permits
38 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
34 Id. at 89.
35 See Dunham, loc. cit. supra n. 27 at 84-7.
36 Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
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Congress to view each possible project in its relation to a comprehensive plan for flood control and navigation in an entire watershed-in
this case, that of the Mississippi River." The nation's power over its
river systems was affirmed in unmistakable terms. And when the
Tennessee Valley Authority solved the problem of a reservoir-flooded
road by the expedient of condemning the private lands served by the
road and turning them over to the Great Smoky National Park, Mr.
Justice Douglas joined Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in
rejecting attack on the "public purpose" of the taking: "When
Congress has spoken on this subject 'Its decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility' "3 ---the affirmance
of legislative power to choose the uses of property that was later
spelled out in Berman v. Parker.

But there has been no such agreement on the price to be paid for
the exercise of this power. When TVA condemned lands of a private
power company for a damsite, it took a second argument in the
Supreme Court before a 5-4 majority decided that fair compensation
need not include the potential value of the land for hydroelectric
purposes resulting from the fact that state law had given the company
the privilege of eminent domain with which to assemble other lands
for its project. 9 "The law of eminent domain is fashioned out of the
conflict between the people's interest in public projects and the principle of indemnity to the landowner," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas. The
power North Carolina had delegated to the company was not "private
property" under the fifth amendment; "an award based on the value
of that privilege would be an appropriation of public authority to a
wholly private end."4 Frustration of an opportunity created by this
privilege is not a compensable element of appropriation. Another 5-4
majority, a few years later, held that Oklahoma courts could admit
the value of land as a damsite in state eminent domain proceedings
brought by the holder of a Federal Power Commission license to construct the dam.41 Mr. Justice Douglas, for the dissenters, relied on
the Federal Power Act's assertion of federal dominion and control
8rId. at 525.
38 U.S. ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946), quoting Old Dominion
Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66. See Comment, The Public Use Limitation on
Eminent Domain: An Advance Requien, 58 YALEL.J.599 (1949) ; Dunham, loc. cit.
supra n. 27.
3D U.S. ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943). Mr. Justice Wiley B.
Rutledge replaced Mr. Justice James F. Byrnes after the first argument in 1942.
4o
Id.at 280.
4
1 Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro., 335 U.S. 359 (1948).
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over the water power at stake; "when respondent's claim is recognized,
the effect is to make petitioner pay a private claimant for a privilege
which only the United States can grant." 2 The next year he again
spoke for four dissenters as the Court, in another twice-argued case,
granted compensation when a federal navigation dam on the Mississippi impaired drainage from lands adjoining a nonnavigable tributary;
"no vested private right is given to anyone, as against the public
interest, in the full utilization and control of the river's bed for navigation or in the flow of the stream within it."" Concurring in another
decision on the same day, he emphasized that payment to landowners
losing floodwaters as a result of the Central Valley Project was not
required by the Constitution, but only because Congress chose to
recognize state water rights under the Reclamation Act." The issue
of Federal payment to private parties for water-power rights in a
navigable stream led him to dissent once more when the Court held,
4-3, that a private utility's payments for such water rights under state
law should be allowed in computing a Federal Power Act licensee's
amortization reserve and net investment in a project, which governs
the price of eventual federal assumption of the project. " But when the
issue was squarely presented in United States v. Twin City Power
Co.," Mr. Justice Douglas found himself again writing for a majority
of five to hold that just compensation, for land to be used for a federal
hydroelectric project on a navigable river, need not constitutionally
include the value of the land for such use resulting from the flow of the
stream. The market value of the property found by the trial courts was
$1,257,033.20, as against an estimated $150,841.85 for its timber and
agricultural value alone; if others taking the land by eminent domain
would have to pay for its location value, so should the United States,
said the dissenters." But the Court concluded otherwise:
Id. at 376.
43 United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 at 813 (1950). Mr.
Justice Rutledge and Mr. Justice Frank Murphy had died between the first and second
arguments.
42

44 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 756 (1950), also argued

twice. June 5, 1950, the last day of the 1949 Term, was also the day Mr. Justice
Douglas delivered the opinions of the Court in United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S.
699, and United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, extending to these states the paramount
federal rights over the offshore resources first adjudicated in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).

45 F.P.C. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 258 (1954).

46 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
47 Id. at 237-8. Mr. Justice Burton quoted from Powelson: "The United States no

more than a state can be excused from paying just compensation measured by the value
of the property at the time of taking merely because it could destroy the value by
appropriate legislation or regulation." Id. at 240.
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What the Government can grant or withhold and exploit for its own
benefit has a value that is peculiar to it and that no other user enjoys.
Cf. U.S. ex rel. T.'.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 273 et seq. To
require the United States to pay for this water-power value would be
to create private claims in the public domain.4
And when Oklahoma's Grand River Dam Authority returned to claim
$10,000,000 for the loss of water power rights at a site developed by
the United States itself, a unanimous Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Douglas, relied on the Denison Dam precedent to extend the
denial of compensation to the nonnavigable tributaries of navigable
streams.40 "When the United States appropriates the flow either of
a navigable or a nonnavigable stream pursuant to its superior power
under the Commerce Clause, it is exercising established prerogatives
and is beholden to no one."5 Most recently, Mr. Justice Douglas
reemphasized his view that "a head of water" in a navigable stream
"is not a property right subject to private ownership and compensation
under the Fifth Amendment," while concurring in a decision allowing
compensation for a flowage easement over land above the high-water
mark, computed on the basis of the land's value for non-power
purposes." He is sympathetic when the claim is for values not resting
on private exploitation of the flow of the stream. Where a landowner
claimed compensation for the destruction of timber in the course of
federal construction of Mississippi River levees, he dissented when the
Court read Louisiana law to permit such a taking without notice or

opportunity to salvage the timber. 2
Readiness to pay when government claims private rights for the
public domain, jealous scrutiny of claims to private rights in the
public domain. Mr. Justice Douglas, for a majority of the Court,
would not hold that the railroad land grants of 1862 conveyed a 20thcentury treasure in oil and gas reserves as long as statutory language
permitted a different construction, despite Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
reminder that "Congress was rather freehanded in its disposition of
the public domain ninety years and more ago."5 5 The clause of the
act granting alternate sections of public lands reserved mineral lands;
"we cannot read 'mineral lands' in § 3 as inapplicable to the right of
4

8 Id. at 228.
49 United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
6o Id. at 233.
51 United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 637 (1961). On the
above decisions, see also, 14 STAx. L. Rxv. 800 (1962).

52 General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159, 168 (1956).
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way granted by § 2 and still be faithful to the standard which governs
the construction of a statute that grants a part of the public domain
to private interests," concludes the Douglas opinion.5" And he finds
that the authority of the Federal Power Commission to license private
construction of lines across public lands is sufficient to demand, as a
condition, that the excess capacity of the lines be made available to
carry public power from federal projects; Congressional power over
public lands under article IV of the Constitution is described as "without limitation." 55
For Mr. Justice Douglas, the public domain holds a special place in
the welfare state. In the vast public lands of the West, no pre-existing
private rights impose a narrow, dollars-and-cents, economic measure
on the community's choice of values. In a time of explosive population
pressures on the nation's available space, government is free to find
that wilderness will contribute more than logging or grazing to the
greatest good for the greatest number in the long run.56 And to a
generation that spans the conservation philosophy of the two Roosevelts, that saw the development of the Tennessee and Columbia and
Missouri-Mississippi river systems, the nation's rivers among all the
resources of the public domain particularly invite comprehensive planning for the public welfare beyond the short-range commercial efficiencies of locale, time, and private finance. "TVA is a great political
invention of the century," Mr. Justice Douglas told the legislature of
Tennessee in 1951.5 He reported on the symbol that TVA has become
throughout Asia from India to Syria and Iraq, the area he had traveled
during the summers. "The Tennessee Valley Authority has caught the
imagination of all the people across this broad belt of Asia.... The
TVA is a community project whereby the benefits accrue to all the
people, not to a few promoters. Some call this socialism. But the
people of Asia are not bothered by labels. It is the result that counts.
...It represents an idea that at this juncture of history can be utilized
53 United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 125 (1957).
54 Id. at 120.
55 F.P.C. v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952).
56 See DOUGLAS, MY WILDERNESS, 167-8, 199-201 (1960).
57 Mr. Justice Douglas took the unusual step of indicating his vote to grant
certiorari when the Court declined to review the Federal Power Commission's license
of a smaller Idaho Power Company project precluding the construction of high Hells
Canyon dam on the Snake River, National Hells Canyon Ass'n, Inc., v. F.P.C., 353
U.S. 924 (1957). In the field of compensation law, DUNHAM, 10C. cit. supra n. 27,
99-104, suggests, critically, that only a special rule for the power potential of flowing
water can explain the Supreme Court's recent valuation decisions.
58 Douglas, Tennessee Across the World, address before the General Assembly of
Tennessee, 21 TENN. L. REv. 797, 802 (1951).
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on behalf of civilization against the threat of totalitarian commuism.

5

IV. STATES RIGHTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

In most contexts, as in its refusal to reexamine the "public purpose"
of a compensated expropriation, the Supreme Court has successfully
declined to sit in judgment over the affirmative powers of government
to pursue new and unconventional goals. By closing the courts' doors
to taxpayers and competitors, private attacks on federal programs were
stopped at the threshold.6 0 The application of constitutional guarantees to expanding governmental activities, not the legitimacy of those
activities themselves, has proliferated the issues of private rights in
the public sector.
But in a federal system, the public sector forces some other issues to
decision. Federalism is difficult when its divided authority bears upon
the conduct of private affairs; its traditional premises of dual
sovereignty come under even greater stress to accommodate the
coexistence of two public sectors in a single national economy. Who is
to determine what shall be private and what public? Can a state
withdraw private activity from federal power by making it public, or if
the federal supremacy clause 6 precludes this, does it also permit Congress to decree what activity shall remain private beyond state power
to socialize? And more practically-how is the cost of public services
to be allocated? As the needs and costs of these services increase, the
federal division of functions that begins as an issue of political theory
ends as one of fiscal resources,62 a development reflected in the case
law of the Supreme Court.
In the judicial revolution of the years just before Mr. Justice
Douglas' appointment, the Supreme Court had also substantially dismantled the elaborate structure of intergovernmental tax immunities
that had been built on the classic foundation of McCullock v. Maryland." Mr. Chief Justice Marshall had established that when Congress
5
9 Id.
60

at 799.
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v.

T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
61 U.S. CowsT., art. VI: This constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and
the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws
of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
62 "The problem of finance is the fundamental problems of federalism," flatly asserts
a recent study in its opening sentence. BIRCH, FEDERALS , FINANCE, AND SOCIAL
LEGISLATION xi (1955). For a review of the U.S. experience, see 8-44.
63 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
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chose to charter and in part finance and manage a national bank as a
means of federal financial policy, Maryland could not levy a tax on the
notes issued by the bank. The immunity had soon been expanded
from the federal operation itself to the personal income derived from
investment in federal bonds or from federal employment.64 In 1871,
Collector v. Day65 pronounced a theory of reciprocity, drawn from
premises of dual sovereignity, to hold the salary of a state judge
immune from a federal income tax. Mr. Justice Bradley, in dissent,
raised the alarm: "Where are we to stop in enumerating the functions
of the State governments which will be interfered with by Federal
taxation? If a State incorporates a railroad... or a bank,... reserving, perhaps, a percentage on the stock or profits, for the supply of its
own treasury, will the bonds or stock of such an institution be free
from Federal taxation?" 6 His warning was heeded. By 1905, the
Court refused immunity from the federal excise tax on liquor sales to
South Carolina's state liquor monopoly. It is a question whether the
spectre of socialism or that of shrewd commercial acumen on the part
of state governments haunted the majority more. South Carolina's
annual profits had been over half a million dollars. "Mingling the
thought of profit with the necessity of regulation may induce the State
to take possession, in like manner, of tobacco, oleomargarine, and all
other objects of internal revenue tax," wrote Mr. Justice Brewer.
More than this. There is a large and growing movement in the country
in favor of the acquisition and management by the public of what are
termed public utilities, including not merely therein the supply of gas
and water, but also the entire railroad system ....We may go even a
step further. There are some insisting that the State shall become the
owner of all property and the manager of all business ....If this
change should be made in any State, how much would that State contribute to the revenue of the Nation ?68

To draw the line in the conflict between the federal power to tax and
the constitutional immunity of a state's property and functions, he
turned to the assumptions of 1787, when "Utopian theories" and
"modern notions as to the extent to which the functions of a State may
be carried" had no hold.69 Finding a familiar line of distinction in the
64 Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (1829), Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie
County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842).

65 11 Wall. 113 (1870).

Id. at 129.
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
68 Id. at 454-55.
66

67

69 Id. at 456.
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law governing civil liability of municipalities, the Court held that "the
exemption of state agencies and instrumentalities from National taxation is limited to those which are of a strictly governmental character,
and does not extend to those which are used by the State in the carrying on of an ordinary private business.""0 The effect was to claim for
the courts the power and duty, at least in granting or denying immunity from federal tax, to enforce a permanent, constitutional distinction
between the "strictly" public and the properly private sectors of a
state's economy.
If the majority of the modern Court was uncomfortable with such
a claim, to Mr. Justice Douglas it would be anathema. Before he had
occasion to meet the issue, the Court had pruned back the most
luxuriant branches of reciprocal tax immunities. First to go was the
extension of secondary, derivative immunities based on tracing the
economic burden of a tax back to a state activity. In 1938, the Court
refused immunity from federal income tax to salaries paid by the
Port of New York Authority."1 Mr. Justice Stone would not go so far
as Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion that, absent discrimination,
personal income should be taxable whatever was the governmental
function from which it derived,"2 only finding the claimed effect on the
states here too speculative and uncertain. But the tenor of the Stone
opinion, stressing the expansion of government activities into formerly
private enterprises and expressly reserving the question whether the
Port of New York Authority might itself be taxed, effectively
announced the reopening of the whole theory of immunity. Yet on the
same day, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional criterion of South
Carolina v. United States in holding that the University of Georgia's
football games were a business rather than an essential educational
function of government and for that reason not immune from the
federal admissions tax."' Ten months later, federal salaries were held
subject to state income tax; 7 Collector v. Day was overruled along
with its most recent progeny, barely two years old. 7 The Court
declined to apply to the federal government any distinction between
"governmental" and "proprietary" functions: "As that government
derives its authority wholly from powers delegated to it by the Con70 Id. at 461.

71 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
72 Id. at 425-27. See MAsoN, HAILA FisxE SToNE: PmLaR OF TiEE LAW, 503-8.
78 Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
7- Graves v. New York ex. rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
75
New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937).
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stitution, its every action within its constitutional power is governmental action, and... all activities of government constitutionally
authorized by Congress must stand on a parity with respect to their
constitutional immunity from taxation," wrote Mr. Justice Stone.76
The main battle over intergovernmental tax immunities was over two
weeks before Mr. Justice Douglas took his seat on the bench. It
remained to be reaffirmed that Congress could claim or disavow
immunity from direct state taxes on the property or transactions of
federal instrumentalities.
Yet the new Court was not done with its inheritance from Messrs.
Justice Bradley and Brewer, the task of judging which state functions
were constitutionally immune from federal taxation and which were
not. Why should not "all activities of government constitutionally
authorized" by a state also enjoy parity with respect to their tax
immunity? Could judges evaluate the state's public activities by
criteria inapplicable to federal programs? When New York claimed
immunity from a federal tax on soft drinks for the mineral waters of
Saratoga Springs, operated as state property by a state commission,
two arguments a year apart failed to produce a majority opinion for the
Court. Although South Carolina v. United States, if followed, concededly would dispose of the case-Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw "no
reason for putting soft drinks in a different constitutional category
from hard drinks" 7 -- the four opinions in New York v. United States
agreed primarily in their dissatisfaction with raising to constitutional
stature a distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary"
activities. Yet if state programs were not to be either all taxable or all
immune, some distinction was unavoidable. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
fighting off the temptation to flee through the "political question"
escape hatch, would limit immunity to uniquely state-owned property
and state activities; "only a State can own a Statehouse; only a State
can get income by taxing."7 9 He was joined only by Mr. Justice
76 306 U.S. at 477.
77 Pittman v. Home

Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939), Federal Land Bank
v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941) ; Maricopa County v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
318 U.S. 357 (1943), and Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952)
(opinions by Mr. Justice Douglas), compare Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624,
629 (1953) (dissenting opinion.) In Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953), Mr.
Justice Douglas dissented when the Court held that a federal statute exempted an air
force officer from payment of a state personal property tax, pointing out that Congressional power so to immunize the personal income or property of its employees had
been reserved when the constitutional immunity was removed in Graves v. New York.
Id. at 327-29.
78 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575 (1946).
79 Id. at 582.
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Rutledge, who also wrote for himself that state functions must be
immune against "discrimination" by taxes not levied on others performing the same functions; "what would happen if the state should
take over a monopoly of traditionally private, income-producing
business may be left for the future.. .I'l Mr. Chief Justice Stone,
with three adherents, would not limit state immunity so far. Discrimination alone could not be the test; a non-discriminatory federal tax
might seriously interfere with a state's "performance of its functions
8
as a government which the Constitution recognizes as sovereign." '
The test should not be whether the subject of the tax was traditionally
a public or private function, he wrote, but rather whether it was
traditionally a subject of the federal taxing power, so that no state
could withdraw from that power subjects of taxation traditionally
within it. 2 Whatever the test, the majority agreed that the United
States could tax New York's socialized mineral waters.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote one of the strongest statements of his belief in the affirmative role of government-a role that
states could perform only if they were protected against the financial
drain of federal taxation. South Carolina v. United States and its
successors should be overruled. The legitimacy of a state's projects,
whether traditional or akin to private enterprise conducted for profit,
was not a constitutional question. "A State may deem it as essential
to its economy that it own and operate a railroad, a mill, or an irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges, street lights, or a
sewage disposal plant ....Here a State is disposing of some of its
natural resources. Tomorrow it may issue securities, sell power from
its public power project, or manufacture fertilizer. Each is an exercise
of its power of sovereignty. Must it pay the federal government for
the privilege of exercising that inherent power?" 3 The majority
sought substitutes for the rejected test of South Carolina. But a test
of discrimination would not do, if it meant that a general tax on the
issuance of securities could be applied to state or local bonds, or an
income tax to income from the sale of public resources.
Local government in this free land does not exist for itself. The fact
that local government may enter the domain of private enterprise and
operate for profit does not put it in the class of private business enter80

81

1d. at 584-85.

The opinion contains five close variants of this phrasing, Id. at 587-89.

82 Ibid.
83
1d. at 572.
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prises for tax purposes. Local government exists to provide for the
welfare of its people, not for a limited group of stockholders ....
Many state activities are in marginal enterprises where private capital
refuses to venture. Add to the cost of these projects a federal tax and
the social program may be destroyed before it can be launched.84
He addressed himself to the views of the Chief Justice. "To say the
present tax will be sustained because it does not impair the State's
function of government is to conclude either that the sale by the
State of its mineral water is not a function of government or that
the present tax is so slight as to be no burden," yet "the power to tax
lightly is the power to tax severely."85 A rule that left states subject
to federal taxes but the federal government immune from tax would
tend to centralize all governmental activities. And more than fiscal
burdens was involved; taxation could be a powerful instrument of
regulation. Reliance on the political guarantees of federalism was no
answer. "The notion that the sovereign position of the State must
find protection in the will of a transient majority of Congress is foreign
to and a negation of our constitutional system. There will often be
vital regional interests represented by no majority in Congress. The
Constitution was designed to keep the balance between the States and
the Nation outside the field of legislative controversy."8 6 Finally, if
there was reason to fear loss of federal revenue from South Carolina's
liquor monopoly in 1905, when beer and liquor taxes brought in onefourth of the federal government's income, that fear was unfounded
in 1946, with a federal income tax from which state employees would
have no immunity. "If the truth were known," concluded Mr. Justice
Douglas, "I suspect it would show that the activity of the States in the
fields of housing, public power and the like have raised the standards
of marginal or submarginal groups. Such conditions affect favorably,
84 Id. at 593-94.

Id. at 594.
86 326 U.S. at 594. The reply was directed to Stone's earlier use, in Gerhardt, of a
85

distinction he drew from Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, that there is
less danger of abuse from national action, determined and constrained by the political
representation of all, than from local action not constrained by such political representation. 304 U.S. at 412, 416. In Mr. Justice Stone's approach to realism about the
federal relationship, the significance of the presence or absence of political restraints
was a major theme, repeatedly sounded on the second beat by the bass notes of his
opinions; cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S., 761, 767, note 2 (1945), McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45, note 2 (1940), South Caroline State
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, note 2 (1938). The sources and
reality of the Constitution's political guarantees of the states have been elaborated by
his 1932 law clerk, now Harlan Fiske Stone Professor at Columbia University Law
School. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543
(1954), reprinted in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, & FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49 (1961).
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not adversely, the tax potential of the federal government.""s Mr.
Justice Black joined the dissent." Mr. Justice Jackson, away for the
Nuremberg trials after the second argument, apparently had also
leaned toward dissent, distinguishing sale of the state's natural resources from sales of liquor. 9
Though New York v. United States rejected the broad view of state
immunity urged by Mr. Justice Douglas, the absence of a majority
among the diversity of opinions left the development of a constitutional
standard unfinished business.9 As the fiscal needs at all levels of
government increase, so does the importance for each public sector of
the taxability or immunity of the other, as well as its own by the other.
For local governmental units largely dependent on a property tax
base, the immunity of federal military and civilian installations and
buildings, and of the public lands particularly in the West, has led
to repeated demands for federal consent to taxation, in-lieu payments,
revenue sharing, or more radical proposals for the sale or other disposal
of much of the national domain.9 On the other hand, the restrictive
impact of federal taxation on state and local governments has resulted,
not from the direct taxation of their activities that Douglas feared,
but from the states' inability, while competing with each other for
private economic investment, also to compete with the heavy demands
of Cold-War federal budgets for their slice of the taxable economy.
Mr. Justice Douglas was right to question, in a time of a federal income
tax from which state-derived private incomes would not be immune,
the realism of Stone's repetition of Brewer's bugaboo that the states
might withdraw substantial segments of the economy from the taxing
power of the nation. But immunity from federal taxation has more
realistic economic implications; one may wonder whether Mr. Justice
87 Id.
88

at 598.
In his concurrence in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 424-27, Mr. Justice
Black had protested against judicial demarcation of "essential governmental functions" and functions that "could be carried on by private enterprise," citing the
examples of waterworks, power plants, and transportation systems; he would have
decided that case by denying the immunity for publicly derived income which was
a year later. See supra note 72.
ended
8
Mason, op. cit. supra note 72 at 770, so quotes an opinion circulated by Jackson
during the October, 1944 Term.
90 In a subsequent challenge to the collection of a Federal tax on admissions to a
state park, the Court found it unnecessary to reconsider the doctrine of non-essential
state functions, since collection of the tax from private individuals, as in Gerhardt, was
too "speculative and uncertain" a burden on the governmental activity. Mr. Justice
Douglas did not sit in the case. Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949).
91 See generally, Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 107
et seq. (1955), and the report of its Study Committee, Payments in Lieu of Taxes and
Shared Revenues. Excerpts from this report appear in BARREr, BRUTON & HONNOLD,
CONSTrrTTIONAL LAW 541-44 (2d ed 1963).
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Brewer himself may not have felt more real concern about the competitive advantage that tax immunity would give public performance
of traditional business functions than he did about the threat to the
national revenue." Tax immunity may not only permit states to develop local economic resources, tax immunity may itself be the chief
or only local resource. Tax exemption may be created to facilitate the
community financing of social services and welfare; competitive pressures will force communities to put this financial asset to the service
of the private economy. It has been reported that thirty-seven states
permit the use of state or local bonding capacity to underwrite the
capital costs of private business developments at the reduced interest
rates of tax exempt securities; more than $400,000,000 of industrial
development bonds are said to have been sold in the past four years,
some by communities of a few hundred persons.93 The privileged position of state bond interest is statutory, but if state immunity from any
major federal tax is grounded in the Constitution, it might similarly
force economic activity into the public sector purely for tax reasons
unconnected with any independent public purpose, and beyond the
reach of federal repeal except by abandoning the tax entirely. (Only
in this sense might state tax immunities substantially shape the choice
of federal subjects of taxation.) Just before New York v. United
States, Thomas Reed Powell concluded a review of tax immunities
by writing, of tax-exempt interest, that fairness demanded reciprocity
between the states and the United States: "It does not follow, however,
that such reciprocity must have a constitutional foundation. Senators
and representatives chosen from the states ought to be duly mindful of
states interests."94 There are risks in the rigidity of constitutional tax
immunity for the states' public sector, and there are risks in relying on
the "statesmanship" of Congressmen. Their sympathy with the public
needs of their home communities is more likely to take the form of
federal programs and grants-in-aid (with the accompanying centralization) than to enhance the financial resources of the state and local
92 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 at 455 (1905) ; cf. the thumbnail
sketch of Brewer's dislike of the "paternal theory of government" in FREUND,
SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, xlix (2d ed. 1961).
93 The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 1963, pp. 1, 13. The interest costs on
one new industrial plant are said to have been reduced 45 percent by Shreveport, La.,
municipal bond financing; "revenue bonds are almost a necessity for this type of
capital investment," another entrepreneur is quoted. It should occasion no surprise
that "a 3,400-acre piece of farm land outside St. Louis, containing only eight registered
voters, incorporated as Champ, Mo., and voted a $3,250,000 bond issue to finance a
plant for R.C. Can Co." Ibid.
94 Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Iininunities, 58 HARV. L. REv.
633; The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, id. at 757 (1945).
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governments from which they sprung, leaving to their successors at
home the choice of programs-and the credit for action. To Mr.
Justice Douglas, states' rights against dependence on the latter risks
justified the former.
Though the issue has been less sharply drawn with respect to the
impact of federal regulatory legislation on state activities, here too Mr.
Justice Douglas has sought to guard the states' freedom to pursue
their public programs. In the light of the supremacy clause, the
question of federal regulation has been statutory more often than
constitutional, and it has not led the Court to seek criteria of state
immunity in the historic, essential, governmental, or other propriety
of the activity. In 1936, when the old doctrines of reciprocal tax
immunities were still in the process of replacement, the Court had
rejected California's effort to use that analogy against the Safety Appliance Act by showing that it operated a state-owned railroad as a
non-profit, public function in its sovereign capacity. Unlike the restriction on taxing state instrumentalities, "there is no such limitation
upon the plenary power to regulate commerce," wrote Mr. Justice
Stone. "The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been
authorized by Congress than can an individual. California, by engaging
in interstate commerce by rail, has subjected itself to the commerce
power.... ."'I The Court has adhered to that holding."8 But after New
York v. United States, Mr. Justice Douglas had some doubts. When
the O.P.A., during World War II, applied maximum price regulations
to the sale by Washington of timber from its school lands and to the
sale of a used tractor by an Idaho county, he was the only dissenter
from the Court's reading of the Emergency Price Control Act to cover
states." He would avoid such a construction because the act contained
provisions (including the Administrator's power to license sales) that
would be "substantial intrusions on the sovereignty of the States,"
he wrote, citing his dissent in New York v. United States; "they raise
for me serious constitutional questions."98 He found that the constitutional line had been crossed and dissented when the Court sustained
federal confiscation of the personal property left by veterans who die
without will or heirs in a veterans' hospital, defeating escheat under
95

United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).

goSee, e.g., California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944), California v. Taylor,
353 U.S. 553 (1957).
97 Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, id. at 103
(1946).
08 Id. at 105-6.
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state law. 9 And Douglas knows that in the West states' rights mean
state water rights and has resisted expansion of federal claims to
control.'
But in the march toward nationalization of the public sector, these
have been rear guard actions. Mr. Justice Douglas has been concerned
that federal regulation and federal taxation should not be instruments
for keeping individual states from moving ahead to meet social needs
by local action. That has not proved to be the role of national power;
rather, federal direction of the public sector has taken the form of
national social programs and, above all, grants-in-aid, to provide federal initiative, federal fiscal strength, and federal standards for activities the states have been politically, economically, or competitively
unable to undertake on their own. The federal relationship as such
does not give the states the standing to attack such programs, nor is
there constitutional substance to such attacks where standing exists.'
Mr. Justice Douglas's concern for the states' affirmative powers has
not led him to question the constitutionality of Congressional programs
or their immunity from state controls. 2 The fiscal powers of Congress
inexorably draw to Washington, D.C., the power to make decisions
that shape the public sector. The effect is to restrict state and local
authorities' choices of policy in spending even their own resources,
for Congress may condition federal contributions on compliance with
federal standards. Because federal grants go to many separate agencies
at different levels of state and local government, and because costs
attributable to the federally-aided programs cannot always be neatly
separated from other state and local costs, probably no one can say
today how much state and local tax revenue-the lifeblood of local
autonomy-is committed to programs the standards for which are
Yet there must be limits on
set and controlled under federal law.'
such conditions if the political values of federalism are to be preserved
despite this fiscal centralization.
99 United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
100 See, e.g. Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546, 627 (1963) (dissenting opinion),
Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 452 (1955) (dissenting opinion),
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 756 (1950) (separate opinion), Nebraska v. Wyoming 325 U.S. 589, 611-16 (1945). But cf. Oklahoma v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., supra note 36.
101 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
102 Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., supra note 36, Public Ut. Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
103 The annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury currently lists 66 separate
programs of federal aid payments to states and local units totaling $8.6 billion. (These
do not include another 52 programs dispensing $2.3 billion in federal payments to
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Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n0 should have been
the occasion to explore the issue. The Hatch Act applied its limitations
on political activity to state and local officers and employees "whose
principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United
States or by any Federal agency.""' When the chairman of the
Democratic State Central Committee was appointed a member of
the State Highway Commission, the U.S. Civil Service Commission
determined that some of his activities violated the Hatch Act and
warranted his removal as a highway commissioner. Oklahoma attacked
the constitutionality of the law on the ground that the threat of financial penalties against the state unless it removed a state officer
invaded the reserved sovereignty of the state.'
The case was argued
and decided together with the more direct appeal against the Hatch
Act brought on behalf of the constitutional rights of federal employees
themselves. 0 ' The issues raised by that appeal were central to the
question of political freedom in the public sector; once a majority
of four Justices, of seven participating, had sustained the act against
the protests of employees, the Court saw little additional difficulty in
Oklahoma's objections as a state.0 "While the United States is not
concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political activities
as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon
which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed," wrote Mr.
Justice Reed. "The offer of benefits to a state by the United States
dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly
individuals, mostly in farming, education, health and welfare, and in national guard
units throughout the states.) In fiscal 1963, state and local agencies in Washington
received $166 million, in Oregon $138 million. 1963 Rep. Sec. of Treas., Table 95.
Participation in such federal programs generally requires matching funds as well as
compliance with federal standards. The state's obligation may range from merely
administrative costs to tvo-thirds or more of the total. A recent compilation in Oregon identified the matching formulas and federal requirements of 54 programs receiving $71 million in 1961, but the study did not calculate what amount and what proportion of state revenues were committed to these federally conditioned programs.
Oregon Department of Finance and Administration, Summary of Federal Grant-inAid programs in Oregon (1962). It may help to show at least an order of magnitude
that Oregon's total state expenditures in 1961 (including the federal-aid funds) were
$287.6 million. During that year, the federal government disbursed $7 billion to state
and local governments and supplied 13.2 percent of all their general revenues. United
States Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances in 1961, 6, 11, 35 (1962).
104330 U.S. 127 (1947).
'Or Id. at 129, quoting 53 Stat. 1147, as amended, 54 Stat. 767.
LO0
Id. at 142.
107United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), reargued after being
held over from the October, 1945 Term.
108 I refer to the constitutional issue; in both cases there were preliminary questions
of judicial review.
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for the general welfare, is not unusual.'... Mr. Justice Douglas, who
had dissented with respect to the rights of the federal employee, joined
the majority opinion; Black and Rutledge merely noted their dissent.
But Mr. Justice Reed's easy generalizations about conditioned federal benefits prove too much. Even the liberal dissenters in 1936 had
found the power to spend not beyond constitutional limitations, "it
may not be used to coerce action left to state control."' 10 If Congress
chose to forbid any state officer who spends federal grants to take part
in a political campaign, could Oklahoma not choose to have an elected
highway commission? State officers, from governors and legislators to
city councilmen and school board members, increasingly administer
programs aided by federal funds; may Congress constitutionally determine which may be elected, which others politically appointed, and
which must be in a non-partisan career status?... Surely a line may
be perceived between such conditions and conditions that go to the
substance of the federally supported project, for instance that it fit
a national plan, or be soundly engineered, or meet prescribed standards
of hours, wages, or nondiscrimination in employment, or be fairly and
109 330 U.S. at 143-44, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon and Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, supra note 101, and United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). The opinion
mentions that "nothing in this record shows any attempt to suspend Mr. Paris from
his duties as a member of the State Highway Commission" and "no penalty was
imposed upon the State.... Oklahoma adopted the 'simple expedient' of not yielding
to what she urges is federal coercion," ibid., but the sentences quoted in the text leave
little doubt that the United States could enforce the Hatch Act conditions on its grant
of federal highway funds.
110 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, at 87 (1936).
III Federal law does in fact impose such requirements, which may substantially
control the administrative organization of state government, particularly in social welfare programs. These requirements, and recommendations for confining them to
qualitative or performance standards and for providing procedures to determine
federal-state conflicts, were the subject of a report to the Governors' Conference in
1962, following a resolution at the 1961 conference deploring "the tendency of federal
agencies to dictate the organizational form and structure through which the states
carry out federally supported programs." The Council of State Governments, State
Government Organization and Federal Grant-in-Aid Program Requirements (1962).
See also Governmental Affairs Institute, The Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid on the
Structure and Functions of State and Local Governments (1955). A study of the
"conditions and controls involved in the administration of Federal grants programs,"
is currently being prepared, pursuant to is statutory mandate, 73 Stat. 703 (1959), 5
U.S.C. 2372(3) (Supp. IV, 1963), by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations; see its Fifth Annual Report, p. 26 (January 31, 1964). A constitutional
limit on Congressional power to impose political conditions on state government might
seem illusory, since many programs now administered by states could presumably be
administered by federal employees, federally-appointed state committees, or special
agencies locally created according to federal specifications. No doubt the political
autonomy of the states still maintains a greater role through the administration of
federally-supported programs, even under political requirements like the Hatch Act,
than it would if the states lost both the administration of the programs and the
accompanying requirements. On the other hand, Congress might well accept judicial
limits on political conditions in grants-in-aid rather than switch to direct federal
administration.
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honestly administered. Whether and where such a line is drawn could
determine, as much as any tax immunity, the role of federalism as a
safeguard of political democracy in a centripetal public economy. If
New York v. United States is unfinished business, so is Oklahoma
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n.
V. Tm RIGHT To Wopx
In 1929, when the nation's business was business, there had been
three million public employees, about six percent of a civilian labor
force of almost 50 million, or ten percent of non-agricultural employment. When Mr. Justice Douglas began his judicial career public
employees, after a decade of the depression, numbered four million
of 55 million workers, over 13 percent of non-farm employment. By
1960, more than 8y million men and women worked for local, state,
and federal public agencies, 16 percent of all Americans employed
outside agriculture." 2 The power of government as employer over their
lives, as compared with those of citizens generally, has raised crucial
issues of constitutional rights in the public sector.
The generation that enacted the Hatch Act, in Mr. Justice Douglas's
first year on the Supreme Court," 3 and found it constitutional could
still look back to the best of authority that in relation to those who
chose to work for it, government was an employer, not a government.
Public employment was a privilege it could extend, condition, or withdraw at will. Judge Holmes of Massachusetts had enshrined it in one
of his ineradicable epigrams when a policeman protested his removal
for political activity: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.""' 4
On such a theory the United States Supreme Court had sustained state
and federal power to impose the eight-hour day and other conditions on
public employment and government contracts that at the time would
have been held an invasion of "liberty of contract" if applied to the
private economy."' In 1915, an Arizona law requiring any employer
112 All data are from Kruger, Trends in Public Employmmit, in PRocEEDiNGs OF
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEMXNG OF INDUsTRIAL RELATIONS REsF.ARcn AssocATION,

354-66 (1962). Since World War II the important growth has been in the state and
local sector. In 1960, local government employed 4.8 million (55 percent), states 1.6
million (18 percent), and federal agencies 2.4 million (27 percent) civilian workers.
Since 1929, public employment has increased 175 percent while population and total
labor force have gained 50 percent and 43 percent respectively.
11 The acts of August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1147, and July 19, 1940, 54 Stat. 767, were
involved in the Hatch Act decisions. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 78 n. 1.
'4McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
11 Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907), Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207

(1903).
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of more than five workers to employ "not less than eighty per cent
qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States" had been
held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out that "the act is not limited to
persons who are engaged on public work or receive the benefit of public
moneys. The discrimination here involved is imposed upon the conduct
of ordinary private enterprise.""1 1 Yet at the same time, the Court had
sustained a New York statute limiting employment on public works
to citizens, with preference to residents of New York. If a state could
limit employment on public works to eight hours, said Mr. Justice
McKenna for a unanimous Court, it could prescribe who might and
who might not be permitted to labor on them, "no court has authority
to review its action in that respect. 17 But by 1947 the Court was no
longer willing to follow the doctrine of unrestrained government discretion over the privilege of employment that far. Its potential significance in an era of increasing public activity was apparent. Thus the
Hatch Act's proscription of political activity by federal employees was
sustained by a bare majority of four, against the constitutional claims
of a roller in the United States mint who was a ward executive committeemen of his political party, because on a balancing of the restrictions on his liberty against the values of a politically neutral civil
service, Congress was found to have acted "within reasonable limits." '
None would deny, wrote Mr. Justice Reed, that the Bill of Rights
limits Congressional power over government employment, for instance
disqualification of Republicans, Jews or Negroes, or proscription of
participation in religious activities. Holmes's summary treatment of
the hapless policeman was relegated to a historical footnote." 9 Mr.
Justice Black, joined in dissent by Mr. Justice Rutledge, thought the
116
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40 (1915).

1117Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915).

Heim was argued three days before
and the decision rendered four weeks after Truax; neither opinion referred to the
other. In the companion case, Crane v. New York, id. at 195 (1915), the New York
Appellate Division had held the statute an unconstitutional discrimination against
aliens. Judge Cardozo, on the New York Court of Appeals, had overcome his own
doubts: "To disqualify aliens is discrimination, indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination; for the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the
advancement and profit of the members of the state.... Whatever is a privilege rather
than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship." People v. Crane, 214 N.Y.
154, 161, 164; 108 N.E. 427, 429, 430 (1915). The doctrine of Heim v. McCall was
extra-judicially demolished in Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM.
L. REv. 99 (1916). But its concept of unreviewability of the procurement policies of
government, "like private individuals and businesses," was still seductive to Mr. Justice
Black, writing for an 8-1 Court in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127,
n. 15 (1940).
11s United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-102 (1947).
119 Id. at 99, n. 34.
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prohibition against active participation in political campaigns unconstitutional on its face under the first amendment.'
Mr. Justice Douglas, too, dissented; but his separate opinion explored more deeply the dilemma of neutralizing the civil servant in
a political democracy. He found the model for a solution in the English
distinction between industrial and administrative employees. The staffs
in offices that make and supervise government policies, "who have
access to the files, who meet the public, who arrange appointments,
who prepare the basic data on which policy decisions are made,"
might require protection both from the temptations of partisanship
and the pressures of patronage politics.' 2' But a roller in the mint
was an industrial worker, like a worker in any other shop, railroad,
or factory except for the fact of government operation. The civil
service concept, however valuable, could not in a democracy remain
coextensive with a growing public sector in the economy:
Can all of those categories of industrial employees constitutionally be
insulated from American political life? If at some future time it should
come to pass in this country, as it has in England, that a broad policy
of state ownership of basic industries is inaugurated, does this decision
mean that all of the hundreds of thousands of industrial workers
affected could be debarred from the normal political activity which
is one of our valued traditions ?,,122
Blue-collar government workers as much as white-collar clerks pose
the risks of being made the willing or unwilling tools of a political
machine. But these risks can be met by laws directed against the
political misuse of supervisory power over the hiring, dismissal, and
direction of personnel, they do not require depriving millions of public
employees of their rights of citizenship. "Those rights are too basic
and fundamental in our democratic political society to be sacrificed
or qualified for anything short of a clear and present danger to
the civil service system," concluded Mr. Justice Douglas. "No such
showing has been made in the case of these industrial workers which
justifies their political sterilization as distinguished from selective
measures aimed at the coercive practices on which the spoils system
23
feeds."'
20

Id. at 105-115. Black drew the first amendment line between forbidding the collection of political contributions from or by government employees, previously sustained, and restricting the employees' own political activities, a distinction that is significant for the constitutional problems of all corrupt practices legislation.
121 Id. at 115-122.
122 Id. at 123.
123Id. at 126.
'
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In the Hatch Act cases, public employees claimed the constitutional
freedom to pursue conventional political activities. The government
worker wanted to be a ward committeeman; Oklahoma appointed a
party chairman to a state highway commission. The issues of the
spoils and merit systems were as indigenous as Andrew Jackson and
Chester A. Arthur. But while the Justices were examining those issues,
the Cold War was inaugurating a period of national preoccupation with
Communism which brought to the Court a stream of cases that cast
the civil servant's claims of liberty in an alien light. In the long run,
United Public Workers and Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n posed the
constitutional problem that will return for new solutions-the problem
of the political constituency in a democracy in which a quarter, a third,
or more of the labor force works in the public sector." 4 But before
McAuliffe's ghost could be wholly exorcised, the search for doctrinal
foundations had to move on to a new terrain, where government workers defended themselves against dismissal for indiscretions with Karl
Marx rather than Alexander Hamilton, and subversion rather than
corruption was the favorite charge of the "outs" against the "ins."
The focus on liberty in the public sector shifted from the employee
whose spare time efforts went toward turning the government over
to the Republicans, or keeping it safely Democratic, to one who might
want to abolish it altogether. Inevitably, the changed focus evoked
different analogies, different responses, a different rhetoric.
Both the federal loyalty program and the first of its local counterparts reached the Supreme Court in the October 1950 Term. There
were few precedents. In 1946, the Court had turned to the analogy
of the Reconstruction period to find that a Congressional act stopping
the pay of named federal employees on grounds of alleged subversion
constituted a bill of attainder." 5 But the manner in which the Vinson
1241
In Oregon, for example, a successful initiative in 1958 amended the state constitution to permit teachers to serve in the legislature, after this had been held to
violate the sparation of powers. OR. CONST. art. XV, sec. 8 (1963); Monaghan v.
School Dist. No. 1, 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957). The Commission on Constitutional Revision which prepared a proposed new constitution for Oregon found the issue
of public employees' eligibility for legislative service (and of legislators' eligibility
to be teachers) one of its hardest and most controversial problems; it proposed that
only such public employment by legislators be excluded "for which compensation is
paid directly by the state government," i.e. not by or through local public agencies.
REVISED OR. CoNsT. art IV, sec. 11. A California appellate court has held that a
provision for forfeiture of office by any civil servant who becomes a candidate for
elective office unconstitutionally deprive public employees of rights of state and federal
citizenship, at least insofar as it extended to candidacies that would not interfere with
performance of the employee's present duties. Kinnear v. City and County of San
Francisco, 35 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1963).
citing Cummings v. Missouri,
125 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946),
4 Wall. 277 (1867) and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867). The constitutional
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Court would respond to the legislative campaign against internal Communism had been determined in the 1949 Term. Justices Murphy and
Rutledge had died within two months of each other during the summer
of 1949, to be replaced by President Truman's Attorney General,
Tom Clark, and ex-Senator Sherman Minton. Injuries from a summer
accident kept Mr. Justice Douglas off the bench during most of the
year. When the non-Communist affidavit imposed on labor union officials by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 came before the Court, Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson spoke for four of the six participating justices
in holding that the effects on first amendment rights of this political
disqualification in the private sector were justified by the threat to
interstate commerce from political strikes and other consequences
of Communist union leadership. 2 Mr. Justice Jackson concurred
by finding the Communist Party a foreign-directed conspiracy masquerading as a radical political party.1 Mr. Justice Black alone
dissented. The following year brought to the Court not only the
federal loyalty program but also the convictions of the leaders of
the Communist Party under the Smith Act. The issue of the constitutional status of political radicalism was irretrievably submerged in
the immediate concern with the domestic defense against a hostile
foreign power. Because of the "inflammable nature of world conditions" in 1949 (including the then recent Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade), Congress was found to have acted
constitutionally in 1940 in enacting a statute originally designed to
meet the threats of pre-World-War I revolutionaries, as had the executive in prosecuting under it the defendants' 1945 reconversion from
the war-time, "national unity" Communist Political Association to the
traditional, revolutionary and conspiratorial organization of the Communist Party 2
proscription of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws runs against both the United
States and the states. U.S. CoNsT., art. I, sec. 9, 10.
126 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399406 (1950).
127 Id. at 422-28. Mr. Justice Jackson (in his separate opinion) thought unconstitutional, however, the requirement that union officials disclaim belief in illegal overthrow of the government. Id. at 435-44. In Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950),
Mr. Justice Douglas could join the previous dissenters with respect to the disclaimer
of beliefs, causing the Court to be evenly divided on this issue.
128 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, The Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, directed
against "violent overthrow" of the government and attempts, advocacy, organization,
and conspiracy toward that end, follows in its diagnosis of and prescription against
revolution the New York Anarchy Act of 1902, enacted after the assassination of
President McKinley, which was sustained over the dissent of Justices Holmes and
Brandeis in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Dennis the Chief Justice
(as had Judge Learned Hand in the Court of Appeals, 183 F.2d 201 (1950) cited
current "uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations
with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned"
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In this setting, unlike the Hatch Act cases four years earlier, the
rubrics under which issues were shaped and decided were not the
government worker's political rights of citizenship but his patriotic
"loyalty" as determined from past and present conduct and associations; and his procedural rights in that determination more than his
freedom of opinion and association itself became the new constitutional
battleground. The federal program of "loyalty" hearings, in which
employees were required to rebut absent accusers who were identified
neither to them nor always even to their judges, was upheld without
opinion by an evenly divided Court, Mr. Justice Clark not participating."' But the Justices found the opportunity to express their
views toward the program in six separate opinions in the companion
case that threw in doubt the designation of organizations as Communist, without prior hearing, on the "Attorney General's list" to be used
by government agencies in their personnel investigations. 3 ' At the
same 1950 Term, the Court split with five opinions in sustaining a
Los Angeles ordinance requiring loyalty oaths and affidavits disclosing
or denying present or past Communist affiliations from city employees,
in the first of the many cases arising from the efforts of local officials
to share in preserving the national security and to protect their communities against revolution by local public servants.' 3'
For Mr. Justice Douglas, the starting point in denying the validity
of the Hatch Act restraints on civil servants had been recognition that
the great mass of public employees could not in a democracy be removed from the political constituency and denied the citizen's right
of participation. In the loyalty cases, his starting premise was that
disqualification for employment was a grievous loss, certainly no less
than a deprivation of property, and when inflicted by government for
a cause such as "disloyalty" was akin to a punishment demanding
the highest procedural safeguards. The employee's stake in his job,
in order to meet a much watered-down version of the danger that Holmes and
Brandeis had thought required before political advocacy could be prohibited, 341
U.S. at 510-11. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred individually; Justice
Black and Douglas wrote dissents applying first amendment guarantees to the violation of the Smith Act as alleged and proved rather than to the cold war implications of Communism. The Chief Justice's ruling "is in my view not responsive to
the issue in the case," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas. "We might as well say that the
speech of petitioners is outlawed because Soviet Russia and her Red Army are a
threat to world peace ;" going on to state that no evidence either of record or within
the reach of judicial notice suggested that the Communist Party had gained the
strategic strength to endanger the nation by advocating Soviet policies. Id. at 587-89.
129 Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
13o Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
131 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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not in his liberty to pursue unorthodox politics, was the first focal
point. In an urban and industrial society, the job, the opportunity
to earn a living by one's efforts and skills, rather than land or other
tangible property, is the fundamental economic base of individual
liberty. "The right to work has become the primary plank in the
platform of the welfare state," he had said in Los Angeles in 1949.32
Dorothy Bailey, he wrote about the federal loyalty program, "was on
trial for her reputation, her job, her professional standing . ...
Of
course, no one has a constitutional right to a government job. But
every citizen has a right to a fair trial when his government seeks to
deprive him of the privileges of first-class citizenship." '
And the
Los Angeles oath and affidavit requirement should be held a bill of
attainder under the Civil War precedents:'
"Deprivation of a man's
means of livelihood by reason of past conduct, not subject to this
penalty when committed, is punishment whether he is a professional
man, a day
laborer who works for private industry, or a government
' s

employee. M8

In subsequent cases, Mr. Justice Douglas maintained this first
premise that the government employee's interest in his job rates
constitutional protection, but he returned also to a concern with the
employee's first amendment rights to pursue unorthodox beliefs and
associations without risking his employment-the right to escape
McAuliffe's dilemma. "I have not been able to accept the recent
doctrine that a citizen who enters the public service can be forced to
sacrifice his civil rights," he wrote in dissent in 1952, when the Court
sustained New York's "Feinberg Law" that made membership in
listed organizations prima facie evidence of disqualification for public
school teachers.3 6 "I cannot for example find in our constitutional
scheme the power of a state to place its employees in the category of
second-class citizens by denying them freedom of thought and expression." The prevailing doctrine, of course, saw the position of
New York school teachers differently. To Mr. Justice Minton, writing
132

Loc. cit. supra, n. 22.

133Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, (dissenting opinion), 341

U.S. at 180, 182-83 (1951). As in United Public Workers, Douglas found British
precedent to show "the Government need not be paralyzed in handling" the real
problem of security, if it would use personnel security procedures for making assignments to and away from sensitive position. Id. at 181.
134 See supra note 125.

135 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, (dissenting opinion) 341
U.S. at 735 (1951).
136 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952). A footnote to the quoted
sentence cites United Public Workers and Garner.
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for a majority of six, questions like these were never difficult. "They
may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down
by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to
work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and
associations and go elsewhere. Has the state thus deprived them of
any right to free speech or assembly? We think not."13 The "elsewhere" of this airy dismissal may seem to the teacher, when virtually
all schools are public schools, to have no locale but limbo; but the
comfortable nineteenth-century premises of total individual mobility
in the labor market of a pluralistic society in which government is
only one among innumerable competing employers still override the
modern realities of public education, of accreditation, of the teacher's
investment in preparation for what can only be public employment,
and in the accumulated fringe benefits of such employment. On the
occasions when the majority did find flaws in some personnel security
or loyalty disqualification, Mr. Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice
Black, reiterated in concurrence his continued dissatisfaction with the
Court's formulas." 8 In dissent, he developed a stronger conviction
that government could discharge an employee only on grounds truly
related to qualifications and performance, not for proscribed beliefs
and associations or for asserting a constitutional privilege of silence
when asked about these. "The fitness of a subway conductor for his
job depends on his health, his promptness, his record for reliability,
not on his politics or philosophy of life," he wrote in 1958. "Government rightly can concern itself with the actions of people. But it's
137 Id. at 492, relying on American Communications Association, United Public
Workers, and Garner. A majority of five were more concerned with the associational
freedom of teachers in 1960, when an Arkansas requirement of disclosure appeared to
be directed at favored "civil rights" rather than disfavored "subversive" associations.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
138Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), in which Oklahoma demanded
disavowal of innocent as well as knowing association with proscribed organizations;
the Court left open "whether an abstract right to public employment exists....
[C]onstitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 192. Peters v. Hobby, 349
U.S. 331 (1955), reversed a federal loyalty order; Mr. Justice Douglas restated his
constitutional objection to the system of "faceless informers," referring to the right to
work as a precious liberty within the meaning of the fifth amendment and "more
precious than property itself," id. at 350-52. See also Slochower v. Board of Higher
Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) ; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,
288 (1961). The State of Washington has not spared itself the controversies, bitter
because so largely symbolic, inherent in the exaction of public employees' nonCommunist oaths and disclaimers of subversion; see Nostrand v. Little, 53 Wash. 2d
460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959), 362 U.S. 474 (1960), 58 Wash.2d 111, 361 P.2d 551 (1961) ;
368 U.S. 436 (1962). Mr. Justice Douglas was prepared to decide the question of
the constitutionality of the Washington statute which the Court avoided. 362 U.S. at
476, 368 U.S. at 436.
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time we called a halt to government's penalizing people for their
beliefs."'3 0
As so often, the answers are implicit in the choice of the issue
posed. Crucial is the premise that New York's subway system is
government, which may be held to its responsibility for the constitutional liberties of its employees as well as for the safe transport
of its passengers. If personnel policies in the public sector are seen as
issues of government, they will be judged by principles invoked from
the law of constitutional rights rather than the law of master and
servant. To the traditional view, this change of script casts legislators,
administrators, and employees in unfamiliar roles with uncomfortable
implications. To the city councilman or the school board member,
the question of vocational qualification may seem quite secondary, if
not indeed irrelevant. Is it not enough that taxpayers' funds should
not be spent to support a Communist, or a person of doubtful loyalty
to the very governmental system for which he wants to work, or one
who refuses to respond to questions asked of him in a legally authorized inquiry? Beneath all the sophistication about the dangers of
subtle indoctrination in the classroom and sabotage in the subways,
the answer and its motives will appear at bottom self-evident to men
who see themselves as managing a program or agency for their constituents, not as governing them. And in how many constituencies
during the 1950's (Oregon was one) would it not seem a self-evident
obligation of those charged with political responsibility for the public
payroll to insist, beyond mere vocational fitness, on such standards
of political fitness as loyalty, abstention from questionable associations, and willingness to disclose one's views-even if the necessary
oaths, lists, inquiries, and collections of slanders in personnel files regrettably might be distasteful and even intimidatory to the employees.
Yet how much can be made to hinge on the fact that the subway
conductor works for a publicly-owned transit system? If it is society's
interest in the security of the system that overrides the employee's
political rights, society's need for security is equally great in privatelyowned transit systems. Once a "security" program imposing disclaimer
affidavits, investigations and loyalty disqualifications on the employees
of municipal utilities is found constitutional, a law requiring the same
of private utility companies cannot easily be found beyond the power
139 Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399, 415-16, with Lerner v.
Casey, id. at 468 (1958). See also Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1, 9-16
(1960) (dissenting opinions by Black and Brennan, joined by Douglas).
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of government. If subversive nurses in public hospitals are a menace
to health, so are subversive nurses in private hospitals, and presumably
no more constitutionally immune from governmental inquisition and
disqualification.
Thus Mr. Justice Douglas would apply constitutional guarantees of
liberty to laws impairing a man's livelihood equally whether he pursues
it in the public or the private sector. The occasion for his strongest
statement of that position, in 1954, was in fact not a case of public
employment but of a state's suspension of a physician's license to
practice medicine on grounds that appeared to penalize him for his
political activities. 4 ' Douglas dissented from the Court's affirmance
of the suspension in terms that studiedly swept public, private, and
self-employment within a single constitutionally protected interest.
Holmes's old dictum that McAuliffe, though free to talk politics, had
no right to be a policeman "has pernicious implications," the dissent
begins. "By the same reasoning a man has no constitutional right to
teach, to work in a filling station, to be a grocery clerk, to mine coal,
to tend a furnace, or to be on the assembly line. By that reasoning
a man has no constitutional right to work." If the late Olympian's
shade might object that he had, after all, been speaking of working
for the state, not in a coal mine or factory, that distinction disappears
as both government payrolls and government regulation of private
work multiply. "The right to work, I had assumed, was the most
precious liberty that man possesses," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas.
The dictum of Holmes gives a distortion to the Bill of Rights. It is
not an instrument of dispensation but one of deterrents. Certainly a
man has no affirmative right to any particular job or skill or occupation. The Bill of Rights does not say who shall be doctors or lawyers
or policemen. But it does say that certain rights are protected, that
certain things shall not be done. And so the question here is not what
government must give, but rather what it may not take away. 141
Government may not take away the right to work, whether as a public
teacher 142 or as a private physician, on grounds unrelated to competence for the work itself, and relevance of grounds that penalize and
Dr. Barsky had been con140 Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
victed for refusing, as chairman of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, tc
produce records subpoenaed by the Committee on Un-American Activities. His license
was later suspended under a New York statute authorizing such action for convictior
of crime, but the hearing included much discussion of the political characteristics ol
his organization. See id. at 460-67 (Black, J., dissenting).
141

Id. at 472-73.

142

Citing Wieman v. Updegraff, supra note 138.
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inhibit political conduct is always suspect. "The fact that a doctor
needs a good knowledge of biology is no excuse for suspending his
license because he has little or no knowledge of constitutional law,"
he concluded. "So far as I know, nothing in a man's political beliefs
disables him from setting broken bones or removing ruptured appendixes, safely and efficiently."1 4
In another dissent two years later, Mr. Justice Douglas proposed
a further extension of constitutional protection for the right to work
in the private economy. The California Supreme Court had reversed
an arbitration board's finding that an employer's discharge of a Communist employee had not been for "just cause" under a union contract.
Certiorari having been granted, the majority dismissed the writ because
it found the construction of the contract a question of California law
devoid of a federal issue. 4 Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Warren
and Black, saw this disclaimer of a constitutional issue in the enforcement of contracts excluding workers on political grounds as a "dangerous innovation" violating "First Amendment guarantees of citizens
who are workers in our industrial plants."' 5 Though private employers may be free to hire whom they please, for instance only
Democrats, Shelley v. Kraemer' would make judicial enforcement of
a union contract providing for discharge of Republicans very much
a constitutional issue. "Government may not disqualify one political
group from employment. And if the courts lend their support to any
such discriminatory program, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, teaches that
the Government has thrown its weight behind an unconstitutional
scheme to discriminate against citizens by reason of their political
ideology. That cannot be done in America, unless we forsake our
Bill of Rights." Does this mean that unions cannot be held to clauses
excluding Communists from job security provisions negotiated by an
employer? "It has hitherto been assumed that Communists, except
and unless they violate laws, are entitled to the same civil rights as
other citizens," said the dissent. "Cutter Laboratories is an important
pharmaceutical factory. It may need special protection. . . . But
there is not a word in the present record indicating that it needs protection against Doris Walker. . . .I do not think we can hold consistently with our Bill of Rights that Communists can be proscribed
from making a living on the assumption that wherever they work
143 347

U.S. at 474.

144 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 299 (1956).
145

Id. at 302.
U.S. 1 (1948).
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the incidence of sabotage rises or that the danger from Communist
employees is too great for critical industry to bear.' 47
It is the personnel loyalty and security programs, above all, that
have forced the development of doctrine for the interrelationship of
three constitutional claims: The first amendment right to political
eccentricity, and worse, short of validly forbidden conduct; 4 the "due
process" claim to fair procedures in adverse determinations by government; and the claim that a man's working role in society, without
which political liberty is possible only for the rich, may not be denied
by government anywhere across the range of the public and private
sectors without meeting the standards of the first amendment and due
process claims. For disqualification on loyalty grounds has of course
reached beyond government employees to employees of government
contractors, on government-supported projects (e.g., research), at
high-security locations (e.g., ports), or in other apparently "private"
roles within the range of some government regulation. Walter Gellhorn concluded in 1956 that not less than a fifth of all persons employed in the United States, plus members of their families, had
undergone political investigation; normal turnover and the passage
of time keeps increasing the numbers.'4 9 Yet in federal cases, where
it is free to construe federal law, the Court has found ways to accede
to constitutional claims on grounds of decision that avoid or blunt
the constitutional issues. When an aeronautical engineer lost his industrial position because the government revoked the security clearance that permitted him access to secret information, eight Justices
found that the procedure at the revocation hearing, which did not
include full disclosure of the adverse evidence and confrontation and
cross-examination of adverse witnesses, had not been authorized by
law or executive order. 5 A government argument that petitioner's
loss was only a byproduct of necessary government action-the safe147 Id. at 303-4. Only Mr. Justice Black, among the dissenters in Cutter Laboratories, had participated in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 126,
and he had dissented then.
148 One might include here the privilege of silence about political beliefs and associations, claimed under the fifth amendment's right not to be a witness against oneself.
149 GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS, 41 (1956).
Gellhorn cited Mr. Chief Justice Warren's count of 8 million federal security clearances, Professor Ralph Brown's report of 12,600,000 positions subject to security tests
at any one moment, and the 20 million estimate of Washington's former U.S. Senator
Harry Cain, based on his experience on the Subversive Activities Control Board.
Compare, for the federal programs alone, the contemporaneous Report of the Special
Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program of The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, 114-17, 219-21 (1956).
150 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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guarding of secrets by security clearances, to which no right could be
claimed-gave the Chief Justice occasion for a subordinate clause
placing "the right to hold specific private employment and to follow
a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference . . .within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the fifth
amendment." 5 He went on to review the place of confrontation and
cross-examination among the "relatively immutable [principles] in our
jurisprudence," concluding that though the Department of Defense
had sufficient legal authority to apply an industrial clearance program
with procedural safeguards, authority for a program without such
"traditional" safeguards would be recognized only in explicit Congressional or Presidential action. 52 But three Justices would concur only
in the judgment that the procedures were not authorized, "intimating
no view" as to their validity, and Mr. Justice Harlan in particular
insisting that constitutional issues had consistently been left undecided
in "confrontation" cases."' Mr. Justice Clark, alone in dissent, denied
that there was any precedent for holding even private employment
protected by the fifth amendment, and he saw in the constitutional
overtones of the majority opinion dire prophecies for the government's
procedures with respect also to its own employees. 54
The Court has not yet felt compelled to prove or disprove these
prophecies.'55 They may have substance, if the Court takes seriously
its citation in Greene of Mr. Justice Douglas's concurrence in Peters
v. Hobby.'56 But the "liberty" to work asserted by him, and adopted
by the Chief Justice for the Court, carries broader implications than
that the federal agencies may have to disclose their informers in per'5' Id.at 492. A citation of Mr. Justice Douglas's concurrence in Peters v. Hobby,
see supra note 138, seems now to give his assertion of this constitutional point the
weight of majority approval.
252 Id. at 496, 499, 507.
153 Id. at 508-9.

154 Id. at 510-12, 524. Clark agreed that the majority had to find a right of the
employee invaded before the authority for security clearance procedures could be
litigated, but he denied any such right, distinguishing the cases cited by the Chief
Justice. To him the case was "clear and simple," one of denying, not employment but
access to government secrets. "It matters not if as a consequence he is unable to secure
a specific job or loses one he presently enjoys. The simple reason for this conclusion
is that he has no constitutional right to the secrets." Id. at 514. Mr. Justice Harlan
thought Clark had "yielded to the temptations of colorful characterization," at 510,
but Clark retorted modestly that credit belonged to the Solicitor General's brief, at
511, n. 1.
155 See per curiam dispositions of Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41 (1962), Williams v.
Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531 (1963). Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in both, repeated his
assertion that dismissal or disqualification from employment, under conditions involving the stigma of an adverse judgment, requires procedural safeguards including confrontation and cross-examination, citing Greene v. McElroy.
156 Supra, notes 138, 151.
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sonnel procedures-implications already partly developed by Mr.
Justice Douglas in dissent. Once present and potential employment
is recognized as a constitutionally protected liberty, claims that it has
been invaded can be raised against any of the forms of government
action that, partly under the pressure of the segregation issues, have
been shown to be subject to constitutional guarantees. Such claims
may be raised against laws licensing and regulating professions."' In
the private sector, though Mr. Justice Douglas would not let the
courts help an employer to carry out a discriminatory plan of employment, he concedes that the Constitution does not directly reach the
private employer's practices.' 58 But which employers are in the private
sector? Is the corporate form of organization and use of capital
raised by selling corporate rather than government securities enough,
even if the enterprise operates predominantly under government contract (e.g. defense and space industries) or close government supervision? If the private business of broadcasting is built entirely on the
privilege of using a frequency under license by the Federal Communications Commission, can the Commission constitutionally let broadcasters blacklist performers and other employees by standards and
procedures that could not be constitutionally used by the United States
Information Agency? 59
Implications drawn from the range of government involvement that
has been deemed "state action" against the freedom or equality of
persons in other roles than employees may still seem farfetched when
extended to the "right to work." In this spectrum, even the implications for direct government personnel procedures are far from
157 See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 and Konigsberg v. State
Bar, id. at 252 (1957) ; Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 876 (1961), (Douglas, dissenting, argued that a state could not constitutionally make lawyers contribute to an
integrated bar that takes positions on issues of public policy) ; N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963), enforcement of Virginia "anti-solicitation" laws directed against
N.A.A.C.P.'s litigation of desegregation cases held to violate first and fourteenth
amendments. In Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961), Douglas dissented, on grounds
of "invidious" application, from a per curiam affirmance of a Kansas rule restricting
a Kansas attorney's right to practice also in Missouri: "When Kansas denies him the
right to pursue his livelihood, it destroys his competence for reasons that have no
relations to competency." Id. at 28.
158 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, supra note 144.
159 Cf. Public Utilities Comm. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). Passengers objected
to being made a "captive audience" for music and advertising on Capital Transit Co.'s
street cars in the District of Columbia; the Court found in the action of the privatelyowned utility coupled with the refusal of the commission to interfere "a sufficiently
close relation between the Federal Government and the radio service" to invoke the
first and fifth amendments. Id. at 462. (Only Mr. Justice Douglas voted for the
passengers on the merits of the first amendment claim, id. at 467.) Would Capital
Transit be on any stronger ground if it refused to hire Negro operators? If it fired
an employee for allegedly subversive politics without a hearing? With a hearing?
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established. No regulation could exclude a Republican, Jew, or Negro
from Federal employment, Mr. Justice Reed had conceded in United
Public Workers, and other opinions have repeated; is a state more
free to discriminate, or does the fourteenth amendment command fair
employment practices in public employment without the need of an
F.E.P.C.? 6 ° Can a Negro protest exclusion by race from teaching
opportunities in newly integrated schools, from positions on a state
or local police force? When it is not yet conventional doctrine that
the Constitution requires government to give a fair hearing to an
employee discharged on grounds adverse to his personal record, it
seems fanciful to speculate whether the Constitution requires enterprises merely paid or regulated by government to do so. 1' Yet precisely this point illustrates the shift in the position of the government
as employer. To the Court of Atkin, Truax and Heim'62 a half-century
ago, there were strict constitutional limits on what government might
do to private employers, but government acting as an employer itself
was as free as they. It would not have occurred to Holmes, Hughes,
and McKenna that government management of public employment
would replace government regulation of the conditions of work in
private business as the constitutional battleground.
There is no reason why it should have occurred to Mr. Justice
Douglas in 1939. But as the conflicts of our time brought the issue
to the Court, he concerned himself with the realities behind the
formulas of "privilege" and unreviewable discretion. He accepted
the significance of the fact that modern Americans live on what they
can earn, not on what they own. And he saw that, far from being
160 330 U.S. at 100. Well before this, dual salary structures had been held to deny
Negro teachers equal protection: "It is true that they are not entitled... to contracts
to teach in the public schools of the state; for whether any particular one of them
shall be employed to teach is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the school
authorities; but they are entitled to have the compensation for position for which
they may apply... fixed without unconstitutional discrimination on account of race."
Alston v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992, 996 (4th Cir. 1940). Disqualification from state office on religious grounds was held to violate the fourteenth amendment in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
161 There is no dearth of speculation, fanciful or not, to what extent the Constitution requires "private" enterprises not to discriminate in employment. See, e.g., Berle,

Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights
Prom Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952); Miller,
The ConstitutionalLaw of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. Ray. 620, 664-5 (1958) ;
Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 36-44 (1961). In a 1955
review of BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954), Mr. Justice
Douglas called the author's discussion of personnel procedures in governmentsubsidized or contracting enterprises "the great highlight of the book," 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 1108 (1955) ; he later quoted Berle's description of the impact of security regulations on the "private" employee in his concurrence in Peters v. Hobby, supra, note 138.
162

Supra, notes 115-117.
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immune, the public sector is preeminently the place for constitutional
rights. Government owes the citizens it employs more, not less, than
a private employer; it owes them adherence to constitutional guarantees and that is the ultimate responsibility government in a democracy
owes to all citizens. Thus he has argued that they are entitled, within
narrow limits of administrative necessity, to remain part of the democratic constituency, the masters of government as well as its servants.
A man's freedom in the modern economy, as in the agricultural
economy of the 18th century, depends on the immunity of his livelihood from official prejudice and reprisals. It offers a vulnerable target,
compared to his well-protected freedom from criminal prosecution and
punishment, for the power of government to coerce, intimidate, or
penalize political deviants and other minorities. To Mr. Justice Douglas, the constitutional guarantees of liberty require protection of the
right to work by imposing a constitutional test on governmental restraints: the test of relevance to the task to be accomplished, to
competence for the work to be done."' Whatever a private employer
may do on his own, and though the relevant reasons for disqualification
may vary, the test runs against government whether it governs work
in the private or the public sector. In Mr. Justice Douglas's years on
the Supreme Court, it has been the constitutional rights of the worker
in the public sector that have raised in their sharpest form the issues
of liberty in the welfare state.
[To be concluded in a subsequent issue.]

163 Where neither a forbidden discrimination or invasion of first amendment rights,
nor procedural unfairness, is involved, the author of Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236
(1941) and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) would not, of course,
revive substantive review of the merits of legislative standards and restraints. Cf.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).

